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Abstract.  
What caused the mid-2000s world commodity price “bubble” and the recent commodity 
price growth during the economic recovery after the 2007-2009 recession? The classical “supply 
and demand” interpretation offered by some observers suggests that rapid global industrial 
growth over the past decade – the so-called “demand channel” – is the key driver of price 
growth.  Others have argued that recent bouts of commodity price growth were directly related 
to central banks, especially the U.S. Federal Reserve, injecting too much money or “liquidity” 
into the financial system.  They assert that high commodity prices are a result of excessively 
loose monetary policy. 
 This paper extends the current research in this area by incorporating emerging economies, 
the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations specifically, into global measures.  It is 
hypothesized that factoring BRIC nations into the analysis provides useful information for 
examining the relationship between commodity prices and global liquidity that is not captured 
by advanced country data alone. 
 The statistical model in this paper accounts for the two-way relationships that can exist 
between output, price, and monetary variables in a globally interconnected system.  Various 
tests of the model consistently suggest that the “demand channel” plays a large part in 
explaining commodity price growth whether BRIC countries are included or excluded from the 
analysis.  However, excess liquidity may also play a part in explaining price growth.  In 
addition, factoring in BRIC country data leads to the conclusion that unexpected movements in 
liquidity eventually explain more of the variation in commodity prices than unexpected demand 
shocks.  This specific result is not caught in the sample that only incorporates advanced 
economies.  Therefore, policymakers and researchers should not ignore emerging markets when 
examining commodity prices and monetary factors in a global context.  Studies that exclude 
these countries lose key information on the effects of global monetary fluctuations. 
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(1986,	 2008)	 and	 others	 on	 US,	 euro	 zone,	 and	 globally	 aggregated	 variables	 suggest	 that	
expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 commodity	 prices.	 	 However,	 several	





that	 they	 have	 worked	 their	 way	 into	 boosting	 consumer	 prices	 overall	 (Furlong	 and	 Ignatio	
(1996)).	 	 Furlong	and	 Ignatio	 (1996),	Krichene	 (2008),	 and	Evans	and	Fischer	 (2011)	argue	 that	
while	commodity	price	inflation	was	strongly	correlated	with	US	CPI	inflation	in	the	1970s,	later	on	
(in	 the	 case	 of	 Evans	 and	 Fischer	 (2011)	 in	 the	 post‐Volcker	 era	 (post‐1982)),	 the	 link	 between	
commodities	and	the	CPI	became	very	weak.		Besides	the	explanation	that	the	Federal	Reserve	has	
become	better	at	managing	inflation,	Evans	and	Fischer	(2011)	suggest	that	this	weak	correlation	is	





the	 CPI.	 	 In	 addition,	 rapid	 increases	 in	 food	 prices	 in	 developing	 countries	 could	 not	 sustain	
themselves	and	lead	to	riots,	as	they	did	in	2007	and	2008,	unless	they	were	the	result	of	external	
monetary	 factors.	 	 Kirchene	 suggests	 that	 over	 a	 20‐month	 period	 in	 2007‐8,	 the	 LIBOR	 rate	 (a	
proxy	for	a	global	interest	rate)	explained	a	large	share	of	the	variance	in	commodity	prices.		Policy	
makers	in	2007	and	2008	faced	a	dilemma:	by	raising	interest	rates	to	stem	the	commodity	bubble,	
they	 risked	 pushing	 the	 economy	 into	 a	 recession.	 	 If	 central	 bankers	 are	 truly	 concerned	 about	








into	 the	 broader	 economy,	 Awokuse	 and	 Yang	 (2003)	 find	 that	 the	 broad	 CRB	 index	 is	 a	 useful	
leading	indicator	of	the	federal	funds	rate,	inflation,	and	industrial	production.			
	 While	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 global	 monetary	 liquidity	 and	 commodity	
prices	 that	 only	 factors	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 developed	 world	 may	 have	 passed	merit	 several	
decades	ago,	modern	analyses	that	expect	to	be	representative	of	global	behavior	cannot	ignore	the	
role	 of	 emerging	markets.	 	 At	 the	 very	 least,	 they	must	 show	 that	 their	 results	 are	 robust	when	
emerging	 market	 data	 is	 taken	 into	 account.	 	 This	 analysis	 restricts	 its	 inclusion	 of	 emerging	






Shostak	 (2006)	 suggests	 that	China’s	expansionary	monetary	policy	 in	 the	2000s	coupled	
with	its	artificially	low	exchange	rate	led	to	increased	demand	in	China	for	US	dollar‐denominated	
assets,	including	commodities.		In	order	to	maintain	its	exchange	rate	China’s	Central	bank	has	had	
to	 periodically	 buy	 US	 dollars,	 which	 increased	 the	 liquidity	 of	 the	 yuan.	 	 This	 could	 create	 a	




two‐way	 relationships	 between	 all	 of	 the	 variables	 in	 the	model.	 	 Although	 the	 variables	 in	 this	
analysis	 are	 non‐stationary	 in	 their	 levels	 and	 I(1),	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	 variables	 are	









 ALL	 –	 a	 sample	 which	 aggregates	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 ADV	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 BRIC	
countries.	
Since	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 are	 beginning	 to	 wield	 more	 economic	 power	 and	 influence,	 it	 is	
hypothesized	 that	 they	 convey	 important	 information	 in	 explaining	 the	 relationship	 between	
monetary	 factors,	 industrial	 demand,	 and	 commodity	 prices,	 and	 they	 should	 be	 included	 in	
analyses	that	claim	to	come	from	a	“global”	perspective.	 	 If	the	empirical	results	between	the	two	
samples	are	noticeably	different,	 then	studies	 that	use	only	ADV	 leave	out	 important	 information	
regarding	the	economic	behavior	of	emerging	market	economies.1		
It	may	be	that	what	matters	 for	economic	variables	 influenced	by	monetary	 factors	 is	not	
necessarily	 expected	movements	 in	 interest	 rates	 or	 the	money	 supply	 but	 rather	 “surprises”	 or	
shocks	 in	 the	 financial	 system.	 	Kuttner	 (2001),	using	 the	difference	between	 the	actual	 effective	
federal	 funds	 rate	 and	 that	 predicted	 by	 the	 federal	 funds	 rate	 future	market	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 an	
unexpected	shock,	finds	that	expected	rate	movements	have	minimal	impacts	on	short‐term	bonds,	
while	 unexpected	movements	 are	 robustly	 correlated.	 	 Several	 analyses	 discussed	 in	 Section	 III	
revolve	around	the	impact	that	monetary	shocks	have	on	commodity	prices.	 	Results	presented	in	
this	paper	mostly	 revolve	around	monetary	 shocks	as	well.	 	 These	 shocks	are	 examined	 through	




the	 ALL	 sample;	 this	 situation	 is	 the	 same	 for	 the	 response	 of	 consumer	 prices	 to	 shocks	 to	
commodity	prices.	 	Shocks	to	excess	liquidity	positively	impact	commodity	prices	in	both	samples	
but	 at	 different	 time	 frames,	 reinforcing	 previous	 research	 on	 global	 liquidity.	 	 Shocks	 to	 GDP	
positively	 impact	 commodity	 prices	 in	 both	 samples,	 which	 supports	 the	 “demand	 channel”	
explanations	for	price	inflation.		Interestingly,	in	the	ADV	sample	shocks	to	excess	liquidity	explain	
a	 much	 smaller	 percentage	 of	 the	 variance	 compared	 to	 shocks	 to	 GDP,	 suggesting	 output	
fluctuations	 are	more	 important.	 	 However,	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample,	 after	 two	 years	 shocks	 to	 excess	
liquidity	explain	 twice	as	much	of	 the	variance	 in	 commodity	prices	 compared	 to	 shocks	 to	GDP.		











Since	 these	 results	 reinforce	 the	past	 literature	on	global	 liquidity	and	commodity	prices,	
monetary	policy	makers	should	consider	looking	towards	controlling	excess	money	supply	growth	
if	 they	 wish	 to	 curb	 commodity	 price	 growth.	 	 Additionally,	 if	 coordinated	 monetary	 policy	 is	
needed	to	curb	commodity	price	inflation,	emerging	market	central	banks	should	be	included	since	
their	money	supplies	are	 important	 factors	 in	driving	such	price	growth.	 	BRIC	countries	are	not	
just	becoming	powerful	in	terms	of	output	and	industrial	demand,	but	in	terms	of	monetary	policy	
as	well.	









Debate	still	exists	and	will	 continue	 to	exist	 for	some	time	 in	regards	 to	 the	causes	of	 the	
2000s	commodity	“bubble.”		From	Q4	2001	to	Q2	2008,	the	S&P	GSCI	Commodity	Index	(See	Figure	
1	 in	Appendix	A)	 increased	45.9%	per	year	 for	a	 total	 return	of	498%,	while	excluding	energy	 it	
increased	a	still	respectable	27.5%	per	year	for	a	total	return	of	264%.		Tang	and	Xiong	(2010)	note	
that	the	severe	downturn	in	equity	markets	following	the	US	“dot‐com”	bubble	caused	the	financial	
sector	 to	 look	 to	 other	 asset	 classes.	 	 A	 small	 negative	 correlation	 between	 equities	 and	
commodities	 that	 was	 discovered	 led	 many	 to	 believe	 that	 portfolio	 risk	 could	 be	 reduced	 by	
increasing	the	weighting	of	commodity	futures.		The	introduction	of	several	commodity	exchange‐
traded	funds	(ETFs)	in	the	latter	half	of	the	decade,	backed	by	stores	of	their	respective	underlying	
metal,	 further	 increased	 the	 ease	 in	 which	 commodities	 could	 be	 invested	 (and	 liquidated).		
Commodity	ETFs	also	 introduced	another	demand	channel	 to	compete	with	 the	 industrial	 sector,	
further	putting	upward	pressure	on	price.		While	over	a	decade	ago,	$6	billion	of	institutional	and	
retail	 money	 was	 invested	 in	 non‐oil	 commodities,	 by	 late	 2010,	 this	 grew	 to	 over	 $320	 billion	
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(Economist,	 2010).	 	 As	 investing	 through	 commodity	 indexes	 became	more	 popular,	 commodity	
prices	 became	 increasingly	 correlated	with	 other	 financial	 asset	 classes.	 	 Tang	 and	Xiong	 (2010)	
find	that	futures	prices	of	several	commodities	became	increasingly	correlated	with	the	price	of	oil	
and	 each	 other	 after	 2004	 and	 that	 this	 correlation	was	 stronger	 for	 indexed	 commodities	 than	
those	that	were	not.		In	addition,	in	2008,	when	commodity	prices	experienced	their	peak	and	most	
dramatic	 gains,	 volatility	 in	 prices	 was	 more	 pronounced	 for	 indexed	 commodities	 than	 non‐
indexed	commodities.		During	these	periods,	however,	correlations	among	prices	in	China	remained	
low	and	did	not	change,	suggesting	that	“emerging	market”	demand	growth	may	not	have	been	a	
large	 driver	 of	 price	 growth	 in	 the	 US.	 	 Baffes	 and	Haniotis	 (2010)	 argue	 similarly	 that	 index	






investors	 awash	with	 cash	 from	 economic	 and	 previous	 commodity	 price	 growth	 pumped	more	
money	 into	 commodities	 in	 search	 of	 a	 new	 asset	 class	 with	 which	 to	 store	 their	 wealth.		





Similar	 to	 growth	 in	 commodity	 prices	 overall,	 oil’s	 incredible	 price	 growth	 during	 2008	
prompted	 a	 disagreement	 among	 many	 analysts.	 	 Some,	 including	 efficient‐market	 proponent	
Burton	 Malkeil,	 thought	 that	 it	 was	 due	 to	 supply	 and	 demand	 fundamentals	 like	 the	 growing	
demand	 in	 emerging	markets,	 supply	disruptions	 in	Nigeria	 and	 the	Middle	East,	 and	 record	 low	
inventories.	 	 Others,	 like	 investor	 George	 Soros,	 noted	 the	 sharp	 increase	 in	 the	 amount	 of	
transactions	in	the	commodity	markets	being	undertaken	by	index	investors.		Some	even	noted	that	
by	 June	 2008	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 bull	 market	 in	 oil	 surpassed	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 NASDAQ	 dot‐com	
bubble	 that	burst	 in	2000	(Patterson	and	Stanton,	2008).	 	Khan	(2009)	and	Eckaus	(2008)	argue	
that	 even	 though	 demand	 growth	 proxied	 through	 growth	 in	 GDP	 worldwide	 would	 be	 a	 valid	





After	 the	 collapse	 in	 commodity	 prices	 in	 late	 2008	 and	 after	 the	 recession	 worldwide	
generally	 abated	 in	 2009,	 prices	 bounced	 back.	 	 From	 December	 2008	 to	 the	 end	 of	 2010,	 the	





latter	half	 of	 2010	and	 first	 half	 of	 2011.	 	 In	 fact,	 one	of	 the	 stated	 goals	 of	 the	 second	 round	of	
quantitative	 easing	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 besides	 loosening	 credit	 markets,	 was	 to	 inflate	
financial	 assets	 such	 as	 stocks	 in	 order	 to	 make	 American	 consumers	 feel	 wealthier	 and	 more	
willing	 to	 spend,	 thereby	 positively	 impacting	 output	 (Barone	 2011).	 	 The	 timing	 of	 	 the	 QE2		
coincided	 with	 subsequent	 increases	 in	 prices	 for	 Copper,	 Aluminum,	 Nickel,	 Zinc,	 and	 Lead.		
However,	the	Economist	(R.A.,	2010)	notes	that	the	beginning	of	this	upward	trend	started	in	July	
before	 the	QE2	announcement	and	coincided	with	a	reversal	of	some	growth‐dampening	policies	




banks,	 began	 to	 tighten	 their	monetary	policy	 and	 criticize	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	 relatively	 loose	
stance,	and	accusing	it	of	liquidity	spillovers	into	their	markets.		Roubini	(2011)	expressed	concern	
that	rising	oil	and	other	commodity	prices	are	a	result	of	a	“…wall	of	 liquidity	chasing	assets	and	
commodities	 in	 emerging	 markets,	 owing	 to	 near‐zero	 interest	 rates	 and	 quantitative	 easing	 in	












problem	 to	 be	 examined	 and	 the	 hypotheses	 to	 be	 tested	 in	 this	 paper.	 	 Nonetheless,	 economic	
theory	and	 rigorous	 statistical	 analysis	have	also	 suggested	a	 link	between	monetary	 factors	and	
commodity	prices.	
A	 discussion	 of	 this	 relationship	 can	 begin	with	 the	 theoretical	model	 of	 Frankel	 (1986).		
This	model	is	similar	to	the	“overshooting”	model	of	Dornbusch	(1976)	that	describes	the	short‐run	
overreaction	of	exchange	rates	to	money	supply	growth	in	the	face	of	“sticky”	manufacturing	and	
consumer	 prices.	 	 Frankel	 replaces	 exchange	 rates	 with	 commodity	 prices	 and	 suggests	 that	
although	 commodity	prices	 adjust	 to	 a	magnitude	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	movement	 in	 the	money	
supply,	prices	overshoot	in	the	short	run	before	adjusting	back	to	their	long‐run	equilibrium.		This	
holds	whether	 interest	 rates	or	 the	money	 supply	 are	 targeted	 since	both	affect	 the	 real	 interest	
rate.	 	 Frankel	 (2008)	 further	 theorizes	 that	 lowering	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	 increases	 the	 overall	






by	 testing	 for	 and	 finding	 evidence	 of	 nonstationarity	 in	 the	 price	 series.	 	 In	 addition,	 they	 find	
evidence	of	a	structural	break	in	1985.		Although	before	the	date,	a	one‐percentage	point	decrease	
in	the	interest	rate	is	associated	with	a	5.2	percent	increase	in	the	price	index,	after	1985	they	find	
that	 it	 is	associated	with	a	7	percent	decrease.	 	 Similar	 structural	breaks	are	 found	 for	 individual	
commodities	as	well.		Clearly,	there	must	be	other	factors	omitted	from	the	model	that	can	explain	
variation	in	price.	
Besides	 the	 interest	 rate,	 shocks	 to	 the	money	 supply	 have	 been	 found	 to	 relatively	 and	
temporarily	increase	agricultural	prices	both	in	the	US	(Lapp	(1990))	and	New	Zealand		(Robertson	
and	Orden	 (1990)).	 	 In	addition,	using	a	VEC	model,	 Saghaian,	Reed,	 and	Marchant	 (2002)	 found	
evidence	to	support	overshooting	of	agricultural	prices	in	response	to	monetary	shocks	and	a	lack	
of	 long‐run	 money	 neutrality	 due	 to	 the	 unequal	 increases	 of	 prices	 and	 the	 money	 supply.		
However,	 a	 retesting	 of	 several	 previous	 VAR	models	 by	 Isaac	 and	 Rapach	 (1997)	with	 US	 data	
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found	 that	 extending	 the	 sample	 periods	 with	 more	 recent	 data	 produced	 insignificant	
relationships	between	monetary	shocks	and	farm	prices.		




materials	 in	 the	 form	of	 commodities.	 	 In	addition,	 increases	 in	output	 translate	 into	 increases	 in	
income,	which	should	boost	demand	for	energy	and	food	as	consumer	goods.		Both	Hua	(1998)	and	
Swaray	 (2008)	 estimate	 error‐correction	 models	 (ECM)	 that	 confirm	 this	 relationship	 between	
commodity	 prices	 and	 the	 aggregated	 output	 of	 22	 industrialized	 countries.	 	 In	 addition,	 Hua	
(1998)	finds	that	commodity	prices	respond	negatively	to	increases	in	LIBOR	from	2	to	6	quarters	
after.	





Testing	 different	 identification	 schemes	 and	 sub‐indices	 support	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 analysis.		
However,	 the	 influence	 of	 a	monetary	 shock	 over	 the	 long	 term	 is	 limited	 compared	with	 other	
factors.	 	 They	 also	 find	 evidence	 that	 channels	 identified	 by	 Frankel	 (2008)	 (oil	 inventories,	
supplies,	and	futures	positions)	may	be	significant	in	linking	monetary	growth	to	commodity	prices,	
but	 their	 impact	 is	 extremely	 small,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 indirect	 channel	 of	 increased	 economic	
growth	and	consumer	inflation	plays	a	much	larger	role	in	affecting	commodity	prices	as	a	result	of	
a	monetary	shock.	
	 Analyses	 of	 global	 liquidity	 aggregates	 enable	 a	 search	 for	 relationships	 between	 excess	
liquidity	 and	 globally	 influenced	 variables,	 such	 as	 commodity	 prices.	 	 In	 addition,	 international	
markets	 are	 so	 integrated	 today	 that	 the	 free	 flow	of	 capital	 across	 borders	 undoubtedly	 has	 an	
effect	on	domestic	variables.		Baks	and	Kramer	(1999)	analyze	a	weighted	average	global	real	stock	
return	against	global	variables.		Their	results	suggest	that	excess	global	money	growth	lagged	one	




Sousa	 and	 Zaghini	 (2004)	 use	 a	 structural	 VAR	 (SVAR)	 to	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 foreign	
money	or	“global	liquidity”	on	the	euro	zone	with	particular	emphasis	on	the	transmission	of	global	
shocks.	 	The	result	of	a	positive	global	 liquidity	shock	 is	similar	 to	what	one	would	expect	would	
happen	to	output	and	prices	in	light	of	a	shock	to	a	domestic	monetary	base:		output,	the	domestic	
monetary	base,	and	the	price	level	all	rise.		In	addition,	the	short‐term	rate	eventually	rises,	perhaps	
reflecting	a	 reaction	 to	 increased	 liquidity	by	 the	central	bank.	 	Variance	decomposition	suggests	









the	US	seems	unaffected	by	global	shocks,	apart	 from	consumer	prices.	 	Only	 in	the	euro	zone	do	
asset	prices	increase	as	a	result	of	a	positive	shock	to	excess	money.	
	 Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 find	 that	 deviation	 of	 commodity	 prices	 from	 consumer	 prices	 is	
positively	related	 to	excess	global	money	growth	and	negatively	related	 to	 the	 interest	rate.	 	The	
long‐run	 relationship	 they	 find	 between	 commodity	 and	 consumer	 prices	 suggests	 that	 any	
commodity	price	inflation	will	have	spillovers	in	consumer	prices	as	well.	
















prices	 influence	 consumer	prices.	 	 Inflation	 can	 impact	output	while	prompting	policy	makers	 to	
raise	 interest	 rates	 and	 contract	 the	money	 supply.	 	 Including	 a	measure	 of	 interest	 rates	 in	 the	
system	 draws	 upon	 the	 theory	 of	 Frankel	 (1986)	 that	 predicts	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	
interest	rates	and	commodity	prices.			
Output	 level	 is	 closely	 correlated	with	 industrial	 production	 levels	 and	 can	be	 taken	 as	 a	
measure	of	demand	 for	 raw	materials	 (commodities).	 	A	possibly	better	alternative	 to	using	GDP	
would	be	to	use	an	Industrial	Production	index,	but	these	data	were	not	available	for	all	countries	
in	 the	 sample.	 	 Testing	 the	 response	 of	 commodity	 prices	 to	 output	 fluctuations	 can	 help	 to	
determine	how	important	the	demand	channel	is	to	explaining	the	variation	in	commodity	prices.		If	
the	demand	channel	is	found	to	explain	more	of	the	variation	in	prices	than	monetary	factors,	this	
would	 not	 necessarily	 provide	 a	 strong	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 theory	 that	 the	 acceleration	 in	
commodity	 prices	 from	mid‐2007	 to	mid‐2008	was	mostly	 attributable	 to	 demand.	 	 However,	 it	
would	suggest	that	demand	is	a	more	important	determinant	overall,	especially	for	the	long‐term	
appreciation	in	prices	over	the	2000s	decade.	
Finally,	 excess	 liquidity	 is	 another	monetary	 indicator	 that	 can	 convey	 information	 about	
liquidity	 in	 the	 financial	 system	 that	 interest	 rates	 cannot.	 	 For	 example,	 after	 the	2008	 financial	
crisis,	 interest	 rates	 have	 remained	near	 zero	 in	 the	US	 and	will	 do	 so	 for	 an	 “extended	period.”		
During	 this	 time,	however,	 the	Federal	Reserve	has	 injected	 liquidity	 into	 the	 system	 through	 its	
quantitative	easing	programs	involving	purchases	of	mortgage	and	long‐term	treasury	debt,	which	
is	meant	 to	 impact	 factors	 other	 than	 the	 short‐term	 rates.	 	 By	 examining	 the	 size	 of	 the	money	
supply	 relative	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 economy	 through	 an	 excess	 liquidity	 indicator,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
account	 for	 liquidity	 that	may	be	 in	excess	of	 that	required	to	accommodate	output.	 	This	surplus	
money	 may	 be	 directed	 into	 the	 financial	 markets	 where	 it	 may	 find	 its	 way	 into	 propping	 up	
commodity	prices.	
Despite	the	similarity	between	the	model	in	this	paper	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006)	
and	 Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010),	 models	 used	 by	 those	 authors	 are	 structural	 VARs,	 which	 impose	









reaction	 to	 fluctuation	 in	 the	 other	macroeconomic	 variables	 in	 the	 system,	 both	monetary	 and	
demand‐based.			
	 Granger	causality	tests,	impulse	response	functions,	and	variance	decompositions	are	used	
to	 analyze	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 endogenous	 variables	 in	 the	 system.	 	 The	 latter	 two	
examine	the	effect	that	a	shock	to	one	variable	has	on	the	others	in	the	system.		Shocks	to	monetary	
variables	 (in	 this	 case	 excess	 liquidity	 and	 short‐term	 interest	 rates2)	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 three	
possible	sources	(see	Li,	Işcan	and	Xu,	2010).	 	First,	“exogenous	policy	shocks”	are	changes	to	the	
goals	and	targets	(unemployment,	 inflation,	 financial	stability,	exchange	rates)	of	central	bankers.		
Second,	 economic	 agents	may	 change	 their	 inflationary	 expectations	 not	 according	 to	 “economic	
fundamentals,”	which	 can	 cause	policy	 changes.	 	Third,	measurement	 error	of	 real‐time	data	 can	
cause	errors	in	policymaking.		Shocks	in	the	context	of	this	analysis	are	not	defined	as	clearly,	since	






Data	were	 gathered	 from	 IMF’s	 International	 Financial	 Statistics,	 OECD‐Stat,	World	 Bank	
















the	 2000s	 “bubble.”	 	 The	 furthest	 that	 data	 goes	 back	 for	 all	 of	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 without	
sacrificing	 data	 quality	 is	 Q2	 1995.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 ALL	 sample	 starts	 at	 this	 date	 due	 to	 data	




up	 of	 five	 endogenous	 variables,	 a	 result	 that	 implies	 five	 cointegrating	 vectors	 suggest	 that	 the	
model	might	be	misspecified.	 	When	restricting	this	sample	to	the	same	period	of	the	ALL	sample	




the	 sample	 period	 to	 the	 end,	 in	 addition	 to	 showing	 the	 rising	 share	 that	BRIC	 countries	 have.4		
Notice	 that	 the	 ADV	 sample	 represents	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 OECD	 output,	 suggesting	 that	 the	
countries	in	the	ADV	sample	account	for	most	of	the	output	from	what	are	considered	the	richest	
and	most	economically	powerful	countries	in	the	world.		However,	the	ADV’s	sample	as	a	share	of	
world	output	dropped	by	 eleven	percentage	points	 over	 the	 15‐year	period.	 	 This	 can	mostly	be	
accounted	 for	 in	 the	 nine‐percentage	 point	 gain	 in	world	 output	 share	 experienced	 by	 the	 BRIC	
countries,	 indicating	 that	 they	 are	 now	 much	 more	 economically	 powerful	 than	 in	 years	 past.		
Therefore,	previous	 studies	whose	 samples	 claimed	 to	 represent	a	 “global”	 aggregate	yet	 left	out	












The	 fact	 that	 the	share	 lost	by	 the	ADV	sample	was	mostly	picked	up	by	the	BRIC	sample	
indicates	 that	 the	 non‐ADV,	 non‐BRIC	 countries’	 share	 of	 world	 output	 remained	 relatively	
constant.	 	These	remaining	countries	as	a	whole	did	not	rise	 in	relative	economic	power	over	the	
sample	period.		In	addition	data	for	much	of	the	developing	world	is	either	not	available,	especially	
at	quarterly	 frequency,	 or	 its	quality	 and	 comparability	 is	highly	 suspect.	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	
ALL	sample	is	assumed	the	best	representation	of	“global”	variables	with	data	available.	






of	 excess	 liquidity.	 	 Different	 countries	 have	 different	 definitions	 of	 broad	 money,	 and	 not	 all	
countries	track	the	same	monetary	aggregates	(e.g.	not	all	countries	in	the	sample	track	and	report	
M2).	 	 Hypothetically,	 the	 broad	 money	 of	 country	 1	 might	 include	 all	 of	 the	 different	 types	 of	
accounts	 and	 assets	 as	 country	 2	 in	 equal	 amounts,	 but	 it	 might	 include,	 say,	 repurchase	
agreements	as	well.		If	the	two	countries’	economies	are	of	equal	size,	then	excess	liquidity	measure	
of	country	1	would	be	higher	than	country	2	solely	because	of	the	difference	in	definitions.	
	 Despite	 these	 unharmonized	 definitions,	 this	 method	 retains	 some	 merit.	 	 First,	 taking	
global	money	supply	and	dividing	 it	by	global	output	 is	arithmetically	 the	same	as	 taking	a	GDP‐
weighted	average	of	each	country’s	excess	 liquidity	variable.	 	Second,	 the	broad	money	definition	
chosen	 for	 each	 country	 is	 assumed	 the	money	 indicator	monitored	 by	 the	 country’s	 respective	
central	bank.		For	example,	when	the	Federal	Reserve	directs	US	monetary	policy,	it	considers	M2	
when	 it	 gauges	movements	 in	 US	 broad	money.	 	 The	 Bank	 of	 England	 tracks	 the	 UK’s	M4	 even	
though	its	definition	differs	from	M2.		Therefore,	what	would	be	considered	excess	liquidity	to	one	
central	bank	might	not	be	considered	excess	liquidity	to	another.		If	it	is	assumed	from	the	results	of	
this	 paper	 that	 policy	 should	 be	 shaped	 around	 movements	 in	 excess	 liquidity,	 a	 central	 bank	
cannot	respond	to	movements	in	a	broad	money	definition	that	it	does	not	closely	track.		Therefore,	
it	 is	 assumed	 that	 unharmonized	 definitions	will	 work	well	 enough	 as	 proxies	 for	 global	 excess	






measure	 of	 industrial	 activity	 that	 suggests	 a	 degree	 of	 demand	 for	 commodities,	 but	 it	 also	 is	 a	
measure	of	the	size	of	an	economy	and	the	degree	of	economic	power	and	influence	that	a	country	
can	wield.	 	Therefore	GDP	weights	 are	used	 to	weight	 the	globally	 aggregated	averages.	 	 For	 the	
price	level,	CPI	is	used.		Although	the	CPI	does	have	its	flaws	as	a	measure	of	price,5	it	is	the	most	
widely	tracked	measure	of	inflation,	and	it	is	readily	available	for	all	of	the	countries	in	the	samples.		
As	 stated	 before,	 excess	 liquidity	 is	 measured	 by	 taking	 the	 sum	 of	 all	 countries’	 broad	 money	
measures	and	dividing	it	by	the	sum	of	GDPs.		As	Rüffer	and	Stracca	(2006)	argue,	the	behavior	of	







The	commodity	price	 index	used	 is	 the	S&P	GSCI.	 	According	 to	Standard	and	Poor’s,	 “the	
index	 is	 calculated	 primarily	 on	 a	 world	 production‐weighted	 basis	 and	 is	 comprised	 of	 the	
principal	 physical	 commodities	 that	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 active,	 liquid	 futures	 markets.”6	 	 Energy	
commodities	 account	 for	66.5%	of	 the	weighting.	 	A	broad	 commodity	 index	 is	used,	because,	 as	
Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 explain,	 “an	 advantage	 of	 using	 indices	 of	 commodity	 groups	 rather	 than	




as	 it	 is	 such	 a	 vital	 fuel	 for	 business	 and	 consumer	 activity.	 	 Therefore,	 including	 oil	 in	 a	 broad	
commodity	index	may	produce	empirical	results	that	are	unable	to	be	generalized	to	commodities	








in	 tandem.	 	 In	 fact,	modern	 farming	 and	mining	 and	other	 raw	material	 procurement	 requires	 a	




GDP,	 CPI,	 and	 broad	 money	 measures	 are	 not	 extracted	 from	 their	 sources	 already	 seasonally	
adjusted,	they	are	adjusted	with	the	X12‐ARIMA	method.		The	specific	macroeconomic	data	series	
chosen	roughly	follows	the	convention	used	in	the	previous	literature	on	globally	aggregated	data	
and	VARs.	 	Besides	 the	 excess	 liquidity	 indicator,	 real	GDP	 is	used	by	Rüffer	 and	Stracca	 (2006),	
Baks,	Kramer	(1999),	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006);	CPI	is	used	by	Baks,	
Kramer	(1999),	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006),	and	Anzuini	et.	al.	(2010).		







close,	 reflecting	 the	 higher	 rates	 of	 growth	 that	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 experienced	 relative	 to	 the	
advanced	economies	 through	 to	 the	end	of	 the	sample	period.	 	As	 the	CPI	chart	shows,	when	 the	
inflation	 rates	 of	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 are	 taken	 into	 account,	 the	 global	 price	 level	 has	 risen	 at	 a	




The	 comparison	 of	 measures	 of	 excess	 liquidity	 across	 samples	 displays	 a	 peculiar	














the	ALL	sample	 than	ADV,	 suggesting	 that	money	supplies	 in	 the	BRIC	countries	were	expanding	
above	 and	 beyond	 what	 was	 required	 for	 economic	 growth	 at	 a	 faster	 rate	 than	 the	 advanced	
countries.	 	 The	 point	 at	which	 excess	 liquidity	 for	 the	 ALL	 sample	 became	 higher	 than	 the	 ADV	
sample	also	happened	to	coincide	with	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	commodity	bubble.		This	is	not	to	
suggest	 that	 one	 variable	 caused	 the	 other;	 it	 is	 entirely	 possible	 that	 this	 situation	 is	 purely	 a	
correlation	 and	 that	 the	 two	variables	 are	 both	positively	 affected	by	 a	 third	 variable	 (e.g.	GDP).		












to	detect	non‐stationarity,	 three	different	unit	 root	 tests	are	performed	on	 the	 five	variables:	 the	
Augmented	Dickey‐Fuller	(ADF),	Dickey‐Fuller	GLS	(DF‐GLS),	and	Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–
Shin	(KPSS)	tests.		None	of	the	tests	in	isolation	provide	conclusive	evidence	of	stationarity	or	non‐
stationarity,	 so	 if	 all	 three	 tests	agree	with	each	other,	 then	more	confidence	can	be	given	 to	 the	
result.		
Results	 of	 each	 of	 the	 unit	 root	 tests	 on	 each	 variable	 for	 both	 data	 sets	 are	 provided	 in	
Table	2.	 	 In	general,	 the	tests	suggest	that	the	variables	are	non‐stationary	in	their	 level	 form	but	







Unfortunately,	 estimating	 a	 model	 in	 first‐differences	 focuses	 on	 short‐term	 fluctuations	
and	 tends	 to	 eliminate	 information	 about	 the	 long‐run	 relationships	 between	 the	 variables.		
Ignoring	such	information	could	produce	biased	results	when	one	is	looking	to	examine	structural,	
long‐term	relationships.		However,	if	two	or	more	variables	are	cointegrated	with	each	other,	then	
although	 their	 level	 forms	 might	 be	 non‐stationary,	 there	 may	 exist	 a	 stationary	 relationship	
between	the	cointegrated	level	variables	in	a	long‐run	equilibrium.		Indeed,	in	much	of	the	previous	
literature,	 (see	 Saghaian,	 Reed,	 and	Marchant	 (2002),	 Robertson	 and	Orden	 (1990),	 Hua	 (1998),	
Swaray	 (2008)	 for	 examples),	 macroeconomic	 variables	 were	 cointegrated	 and	 estimated	 with	
models	to	take	this	into	account.	
A	 VEC	 model	 would	 be	 estimated	 similarly	 to	 a	 VAR,	 but	 a	 VEC	 would	 account	 for	 this	
cointegration.	 	With	 a	 VEC	 specification,	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 variables	 are	 assumed	 to	
return	to	a	long‐run	equilibrium	after	a	shock	to	one	or	more	variables.	 	This	way,	the	model	can	

























the	 Trace	 method	 suggests	 that	 four	 cointegrating	 vectors	 exist,	 while	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample	 three	
cointegrating	vectors	exist.		Therefore,	there	is	a	stationary	long‐run	relationship	between	the	level	
variables	that	are,	by	themselves,	non‐stationary.	
Before	 running	 the	 model	 as	 a	 VEC,	 one	 more	 test	 for	 cointegration	 is	 run	 in	 order	 to	
provide	more	confidence	in	the	results.	 	The	Pesaran	test	from	Pesaran,	Shin,	and	Smith	(2001)	is	
similar	to	the	Trace	method,	but	it	only	tells	whether	or	not	a	stationary	relationship	exists	between	
the	variables	 in	 level	 form	and	not	specifically	how	many	cointegrating	vectors	exist.	 	This	test	 is	




Wald	 test	 is	 performed	 to	 determine	 the	 joint	 significance	 of	 the	 level	 variables.	 	 The	 F‐stat	 is	
compared	with	the	critical	values	given	by	Pesaran,	Shin,	and	Smith	(2001).	 	Table	3	provides	the	
results	of	the	Pesaran	test.	
Only	one	equation	 in	 each	 sample	unambiguously	 suggests	 that	 cointegration	exists.	 	The	
test	 statistic	 for	 the	equation	with	CPI	 as	 the	dependent	variable	 in	 the	ADV	sample	provides	 an	
ambiguous	 result.	 	 Thus,	 there	 is	 mixed	 evidence	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 cointegration,	 despite	 it	
appearing	in	similar	analyses	in	the	literature.		The	JJ	test	suggests	cointegration,	while	the	Pesaran	
test	does	not	 strongly	 suggest	 it.	 	One	 reason	why	 this	mixed	 result	may	exist	 is	 that	 the	 sample	
period	 is	 relatively	 short,	 roughly	 fifteen	 years.	 	 The	 case	 could	 be	made	 that	 that	 is	 not	 a	 long	
enough	period	for	variables	to	display	a	clear	return	to	long‐run	equilibrium	that	could	be	picked	
up	 by	 the	 Pesaran	 test,	 even	 though	 they	 might	 clearly	 display	 cointegration	 if	 the	 sample	 was	
extended.9	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 model	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 structural	 relationships	 between	 these	
variables.		Leaving	these	long‐run	variables	out	could	introduce	bias	causing	a	misinterpretation	of	
these	relationships.		With	that	in	mind,	one	could	argue	that	long‐run	impacts	should	be	controlled	
for	 (i.e.	 cointegration	should	be	assumed)	 if	 their	 inclusion	 improves	 the	 fit	of	 the	overall	model.		






run	 information	 included	(i.e.	 the	VEC	specification10)	 is	a	better	 fit	 for	 the	data.	 	Since	 the	 JJ	 test	
suggests	cointegration,	the	Pesaran	test	does	not	strongly	imply	no	cointegration,	and	the	models	
















of	 them	 individually	 Granger	 cause	 the	 interest	 rate.	 	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 interest	 rates	 respond	




while	 inflation	 in	advanced	countries	may	be	unaffected	by	movements	 in	excess	 liquidity	 (apart	
from	 shocks),	 an	 aggregate	 that	 includes	 inflation	 in	 emerging	 countries	 is	 sensitive	 to	 excess	
liquidity.	
The	dominant	factor	in	both	samples	that	drives	commodity	prices	appears	to	be	GDP.		GDP	







support	 to	 the	 theory	that	 fluctuations	 in	commodity	prices	are	mostly	demand	driven,	assuming	
that	this	is	a	positive	relationship.		
These	Granger	causality	tests	only	examine	the	impact	of	the	short‐run	variables,	so	they	do	
not	 say	anything	about	 the	significance	of	 any	 long‐run	 impacts.	By	estimating	 the	coefficients	of	
the	 lagged	 level	variables	 from	each	VEC,	 the	direction	of	 the	 long‐run	 impact	of	one	variable	on	
another	 can	 be	 determined.	 For	 example,	 to	 find	 the	 long	 run	 impact	 of	 CPI	 on	 GDP	 in	 the	 ADV	
sample,	the	coefficient	on	the	level	variable	for	CPI	lagged	3	quarters	is	divided	by	the	coefficient	on	
the	level	variable	for	GDP	lagged	3	quarters	and	then	multiplied	by	negative	one.	Table	6	provides	
the	 estimated	 long‐run	 impacts	 and	 their	 directions.	 	 Unfortunately,	 most	 “long‐run”	 coeffcients	
were	not	significant	(t‐stats	did	no	exceed	2),	so	the	direction	of	their	estimated	long‐run	impacts	





be	 movements	 in	 economic	 variables	 that	 are	 truly	 unexpected	 by	 economic	 agents	 in	 the	 real	
world.		As	Rudebusch	(1998)	shows,	when	looking	at	the	Federal	Funds	rate,	most	monetary	policy	
shocks	 in	VAR	models	 in	 the	 literature	are	uncorrelated	with	shocks	as	perceived	by	 the	Federal	
Funds	rate	futures	market.		Nonetheless,	whether	this	discrepancy	is	true	for	other	macroeconomic	








reaction	 to	 this	 shock	 in	 commodity	 prices	 in	 the	 fourth	 quarter	 in	 the	 ADV	 sample,	 this	 effect	
disappears	in	the	ALL	sample.		





positively	 again	 in	 the	 sixth	 and	 seventh	 quarters	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample.	 	 Including	 the	 emerging	
markets	into	the	global	aggregate	conveys	important	information	about	excess	liquidity	in	the	BRIC	
countries	that	is	ignored	by	shocks	to	excess	liquidity	in	the	advanced	countries.		This	also	provides	
additional	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 excess	 liquidity	 shocks	 can	 push	 commodity	 prices	
higher	and	that	demand	growth	cannot	account	for	all	commodity	price	inflation.		Note	that	shocks	
to	the	interest	rate	do	not	significantly	impact	prices,	whether	it	is	consumer	or	commodity	prices.		
In	fact,	 in	the	ADV	sample,	shocks	to	the	interest	rate	positively	 impact	commodity	prices.	 	These	
results	for	the	interest	rate	are	in	contrast	with	the	previous	studies	on	global	aggregates	(Belke	et	
al	 (2010),	 Hua	 (1998),	 and	 Swaray	 (2008))	 and	 the	 predictions	 of	 theory	 of	 Frankel	 (1986).	 	 It	










to	 explaining	 40%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 CPI	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample.	 	Most	 importantly	 to	 this	 analysis,	
shocks	 to	GDP	explain	 roughly	35%	of	 the	variation	 in	commodity	prices	 in	 the	ADV	sample,	but	
this	eventually	drops	to	about	20%	in	the	ALL	sample.		Although	shocks	to	excess	liquidity	appear	
to	 explain	 relatively	 very	 little	 in	 the	 variation	 in	 commodity	 prices	 in	 the	 ADV	 sample,	 this	
influence	eventually	grows	to	about	45%.			
This	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 two	 samples	 suggests	 that	 assuming	 that	 only	 advanced	
countries	 are	needed	 to	 serve	 as	proxies	 for	 global	 fluctuations	 ignores	 information	provided	by	
fluctuations	 in	BRIC	 country	variables.	 	 Examining	only	 advanced	 countries	misattributes	 a	 large	
portion	of	the	variation	in	commodity	prices	to	shocks	in	GDP.		When	including	excess	liquidity	in	
BRIC	 countries	 into	 the	 aggregate,	 a	 larger	 portion	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 prices	 appears	 to	 be	
attributed	 to	 shocks	 to	 excess	 liquidity.	 	When	 it	 comes	 to	unexpected	 shocks	 in	macroeconomic	




argued	was	 the	main	 driver	 of	 the	 2000s	 commodity	 bubble.	 	 This	 result	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	
unexpectedly	excessively	 loose	monetary	policy	on	a	global	scale	could	be	an	 important	driver	of	
the	commodity	bubble.	
Also,	 note	 that	 shocks	 to	 the	 interest	 rate	 explain	 relatively	 very	 little	 in	 the	 variation	 in	









that	positive	 shocks	 to	 liquidity	positively	 impact	 commodity	prices.	 	 In	particular,	 both	 samples	
suggest	that	this	is	a	short‐run	impact	that	occurs	after	two	quarters.		However,	in	the	sample	that	
includes	 information	 about	 liquidity	 from	 BRIC	 countries,	 excess	 liquidity	 positively	 affects	
commodity	 prices	 after	 six	 and	 seven	 quarters	 as	 well.	 	 The	 insignificant	 results	 of	 Granger	
causality	 tests	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 monetary	 variables	 on	 commodity	 prices	 suggests	 that	 this	
relationship	is	limited	to	movements	in	liquidity	that	is	unexpected	by	agents	in	the	system.		These	
“shocks”	could	be	attributed	to	a	number	of	factors	including	exogenous	monetary	policy	changes	
such	 as	 the	 unprecedented	 responses	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 during	 and	 after	 the	 2008	 global	
financial	crisis.	







	 This	 discrepancy	 between	 samples	 has	 two	 implications	 for	 research	 and	 policy.	 	 First,	
empirical	research	that	claims	to	analyze	relationships	at	a	“global”	 level	needs	to	account	for	the	
growing	 influence	 of	 emerging	 economies	 and	 not	 simply	 the	 advanced	 economies.	 	 Otherwise,	
23 
 
results	may	be	 biased	 as	 they	were	when	 too	much	of	 the	 forecast	 error	 variance	 in	 commodity	
prices	was	attributed	to	shocks	to	output	when	it	should	have	been	attributed	to	shocks	to	excess	
liquidity.	 	 Second,	 those	 who	 criticize	 expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 advanced	 countries,	
especially	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 for	 pushing	 up	 commodity	 prices	 should	 also	 direct	 their	
attention	towards	monetary	authorities	elsewhere,	especially	the	BRIC	countries,	since	information	
on	 excess	 liquidity	 from	 these	 countries	 adds	 to	 the	 influence	 that	 global	 excess	 liquidity	has	on	
commodity	 prices.	 	 Third,	 monetary	 policymakers	 in	 the	 advanced	 countries	 need	 to	 closely	
monitor	liquidity	in	the	BRIC	countries,	since	the	discrepancies	between	the	ALL	and	ADV	samples	
suggests	 that	BRIC	excess	 liquidity	affects	commodity	prices	 in	a	way	that	cannot	be	captured	by	
examining	advanced	country	data	alone.	
Despite	the	theory	of	Frankel	(1986)	and	the	findings	of	previous	global	VAR/VEC	analyses,	
interest	 rates,	 especially	 shocks,	 have	 a	 minimal	 impact	 on	 consumer	 and	 commodity	 prices.		
Perhaps	 future	 studies	 should	 include	an	 interest	 rate	 in	 their	analysis	 that	more	closely	 reflects	
interest	 rates	 associated	 with	 information	 used	 by	 commodity	 consumers,	 producers,	 and	
investors.	 	Some	analyses	such	as	Hua	(1998)	use	the	LIBOR	rate,	which	is	highly	associated	with	
developed	financial	markets	in	the	advanced	economies.	 	Data	quality	and	availability	in	the	BRIC	
countries	 severely	 limited	 the	 length	 of	 the	 time	 period	 analyzed	 and	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	 data.		
Finding	 longer	 sample	 periods	 or	 higher	 frequency	 data	 can	 help	 to	 minimize	 bias	 in	 future	
research.		In	this	paper,	monetary	aggregates	and	short‐term	interest	rates	were	loosely	connected	
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Appendix A – Tables and Figures 
          Table 1 - GDP shares 
 
 
 1995 2009 
ADV as a % of OECD 92% 89% 
ADV as a % of World 61% 50% 
BRIC as a % of World 15% 24% 
ALL as a % of World 76% 74% 
 
 
Note: ADV  aggregates 10 advanced and 
euro zone economies including Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, South 
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and 
the US.; 
BRIC represents Brazil, Russia, India and 
China; 
All includes ADV and BRIC countries. 
 
 








Table 2 - Unit Root Tests 
 
                Stationarity indicated in bold   
 ADV Sample   
 
















DF-GLS -1.8675* -2.3562* -2.0708* -2.810789* -2.916968†  
KPSS 0.1672‡‡   0.1889‡‡ 0.1447‡ 0.0777♦  0.1527‡‡  
1st Difference      
 












DF-GLS -3.7162†† -6.0672††† -4.0488††† -3.7257††† -6.0739†††  
KPSS 0.0717♦ 0.0926♦ 0.0489♦ 0.0751♦ 0.0587♦  
 
                         
                                    ALL Sample 
 












DF-GLS -2.3819* -2.1441* -2.5662* -1.2772*  
KPSS 0.0952♦  0.2132‡‡ 0.1281‡ 0.1667‡‡  
1st Difference      










DF-GLS -3.4190†† -5.4366††† -3.6561†† -1.3940*  
KPSS 0.1077♦ 0.0567♦ 0.0543♦ 0.1438‡  
2nd Difference      
DF-GLS       -1.6456*  
KPSS       0.0866♦  
‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 5% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 1% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 5% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 1% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
♦ Failure to reject of the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is stationary  
* Failure to reject the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
 








          Table 3 - Pesaran Test  
 
           Critical Values at 10% L.O.S.   
ADV Sample  ALL Sample  
Dep. 
Variable F-stat Result 
Dep. 
Variable F-stat Result 
ΔRGDP 2.251 no cointegration ΔRGDP 2.340 no cointegration 
ΔCPI 2.972 ambiguous ΔCPI 3.697 cointegration 
ΔMON 3.672 cointegration ΔMON 1.708 no cointegration 
ΔINT 2.352 no cointegration ΔINT 1.104 no cointegration 
ΔCOM 1.064 no cointegration ΔCOM 1.700 no cointegration 
 
 
 Table 4 - Comparison of Model Fit   
 
      
 ADV Sample     
 Adjusted-R2    
Dep. Variable ΔRGDP ΔCPI ΔMON ΔINT ΔCOM 
L-R included 0.629 0.581 0.639 0.556 0.575 
not included 0.578 0.492 0.534 0.491 0.572 






criterion    
L-R included -29.247 -26.227    
not included -28.277 -26.145    
      
 ALL Sample     
 Adjusted-R2     
Dep. Variable ΔRGDP ΔCPI ΔMON ΔINT ΔCOM  
L-R included 0.554 0.584 0.652 0.413 0.562  
not included 0.481 0.447 0.622 0.406 0.525  






criterion    
 
L-R included -27.913 -24.006     




Note: Variables that Granger cause the dependent variable at the 10% level or greater are 
Table 5 - Granger Causality Tests 
 
 
ADV Sample  ALL Sample   
Dependent variable: ΔRGDP Dependent variable: ΔRGDP  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔCPI 15.37785 0.0005 ΔCPI 12.78546 0.0051  
ΔMON 1.310898 0.5192 ΔMON 9.193505 0.0268  
ΔINT 0.423823 0.8090 ΔINT 0.429312 0.9341  
ΔCOM 4.671602 0.0967 ΔCOM 2.331124 0.5066  
All 20.85097 0.0076 All 19.24144 0.0829  
       
Dependent variable: ΔCPI Dependent variable: ΔCPI  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 16.80843 0.0002 ΔRGDP 29.04524 0.0000  
ΔMON 2.308153 0.3153 ΔMON 7.100639 0.0688  
ΔINT 3.566596 0.1681 ΔINT 9.64327 0.0219  
ΔCOM 6.452635 0.0397 ΔCOM 6.03073 0.1101  
All 53.82122 0.0000 All 63.06572 0.0000  
       
Dependent variable: ΔMON Dependent variable: ΔMON  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 7.619528 0.0222 ΔRGDP 9.205386 0.0267  
ΔCPI 5.488917 0.0643 ΔCPI 0.940509 0.8156  
ΔINT 0.004187 0.9979 ΔINT 2.940834 0.4008  
ΔCOM 2.009606 0.3661 ΔCOM 0.772342 0.8561  
All 27.77509 0.0005 All 32.06436 0.0014  
       
Dependent variable: ΔINT Dependent variable: ΔINT  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 4.372917 0.1123 ΔRGDP 4.388929 0.2224  
ΔCPI 5.149174 0.0762 ΔCPI 2.08839 0.5543  
ΔMON 1.813842 0.4038 ΔMON 1.079492 0.7820  
ΔCOM 3.876191 0.1440 ΔCOM 0.068344 0.9953  
All 19.27495 0.0135 All 21.13584 0.0484  
       
Dependent variable: ΔCOM Dependent variable: ΔCOM  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 13.95322 0.0009 ΔRGDP 19.77027 0.0002  
ΔCPI 9.726949 0.0077 ΔCPI 1.655177 0.6469  
ΔMON 3.336818 0.1885 ΔMON 1.959744 0.5808  
ΔINT 2.398765 0.3014 ΔINT 5.323697 0.1496  
All 45.13677 0.0000 All 50.90374 0.0000  
31 
 
highlighted in bold 
 
Table 6 - Implied Long Run Impacts 
        
   Impacted Variable 






GDP  1.214 -0.130 -8.466 -15.093 
ADV  CPI -2.600  3.095 19.670 9.004 
Sample MON -0.893 0.541  -30.494 -9.753 
 INT 0.007 -0.005 0.013  0.134 
 COM 0.040 0.140 -0.129 3.170  
        
   Impacted Variable 






GDP  4.537 0.700 39.375 16.029 
ALL  CPI -1.256  2.529 58.198 -2.253 
Sample MON -0.638 2.532  -0.638 7.017 
 INT 0.011 -0.016 -0.008  -0.039 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent Variance of COM due to MON
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Appendix	B	–	Global	Aggregation	Method	
	 First,	country	currencies	were	converted	into	US	dollars	at	PPP	exchange	rates.	This	method	
accounts	for	differences	in	the	purchasing	power	of	one	dollar	in	different	countries.			Specifically,	
the	formula,	adapted	from	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006)11	adjusts	the	nominal	market	exchange	
rate,	E,	for	the	level	of	inflation	in	country	i	relative	to	the	US.		The	formula	is	as	follows:		
		
	 While	output	and	excess	liquidity	were	aggregated	into	global	variables	by	summing	GDPs	
and	broad	money	supplies,	CPI	and	the	interest	rate	were	calculated	by	taking	a	weighted	average	
of	each	variable	using	GDP	of	country	i	relative	to	the	GDP	of	the	entire	sample	as	weights.	For	
example	for	CPI	in	the	ALL	sample	at	time	t:	
	
                                                            
11   We are indebted to Andrea Zaghini for sharing the methodology for how the PPP exchange rates were 
calculated in Sousa and Zaghini (2004, 2006). 
